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Abstract
Increasing school resources has often shown disappointing eﬀects on school quality in de-
veloping countries, a lack of impact which may be due to student, parent or teacher behavioral
responses. We test the short-term impact of an increase in school resources under parental con-
trol using an experimental school grant program in Niger. We ﬁnd that parents supplemented
the grant with their own inputs and increased their participation in school management, while
teachers reduced their presence at school. We also ﬁnd that schools where parents have higher
authority have a higher response to the grant. We provide a model of school quality to explain
together those results and existing results in the literature, where the amount of authority that
the parents have inﬂuences school quality and behavioral responses. This framework makes ex-
plicit some conditions under which diﬀerent educational policies should increase school quality.
JEL Codes: H52, 015, I21, I28
1 Introduction
The explosion in access to schools in the last two decades represents an unprecedented eﬀort to in-
crease education in poor countries. However, the quality of education is often low, and in some cases
getting worse as participation increases. Poor quality can result from poor physical infrastructure
(such as rudimentary buildings without access to water, electricity or latrines), lack of recurrent
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inputs (for example, delays in teacher salary, large class-size or lack of educational materials), and
ineﬀective or absent staﬀ.1 Governments of poor countries must face the issue of improving quality
from a perspective of resource constraints, both ﬁnancial and in terms of human resources.
Attention has increasingly turned to beneﬁciary participation as a means to improve service
quality, in part because increasing inputs without changing management structures and processes
have not been as successful as hoped. The input-based approach has had little impact on test
scores. Hanushek (2003) details the lack of a clear relationship between resources and school
outcomes internationally and at the US level, using data from international math and science tests.
In randomized evaluations, Glewwe, Kremer and Moulin (2009) ﬁnd no impact from a program to
increase textbooks; Glewwe, Kremer, Moulin and Zitzewitz (2004) ﬁnd no impact from ﬂip charts;
Banerjee et al. (2002) ﬁnd no impact from additional teachers in India; and Duﬂo, Dupas and
Kremer (2012) ﬁnd no eﬀect of decreasing the teacher-pupil ratio (absent other reforms) in Kenya.
There is a growing concern that the lack of eﬀect of the additional resources is due to indirect eﬀects
through changes in teacher or parent behavior. An infusion of resources or a change in eﬀort from
one of the actors can lead to a change in the level of investment of the other actors. For instance,
parents in Romania decreased time spent on homework when their child accessed a better school
(Pop-Eleches and Urquiola, 2012). In Zambia, households decreased spending for education when
they anticipated an increase in school funding (Das et al., 2011). In Kenya, civil-servant teachers
decreased presence at school when school committee hired an extra-teacher (Duﬂo, Dupas and
Kremer, 2012). In this context, evidence on behavioral responses is crucial to evaluate educational
policies, and estimates of the impact of governmental resources on educational outcomes that would
not take into account agents' re-optimization would be considerably biased.
Involving parents in the management of schools and giving them the responsibility over school
resources might be a better option for three reasons. First, the information problems that contribute
to government failures at the central level are likely to be less acute at the community level. Second,
communities have a stronger incentive to demand high quality service than the central government,
since they beneﬁt directly from that service, whereas the central government beneﬁts only indirectly.
Third, parents might be less likely to substitute school resources for their own eﬀort when they are
involved in school management. Involving parents in school might thus be a way to both improve
the use of school resources, and limit adverse behavioral responses. However, the extent to which
1Chaudhury et al (2006) surveyed attendance in six countries and found 19% of teachers absent during spot
checks.
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participation programs can meet these expectations depends in no small part on the willingness,
ability and authority of parents: it may be costly and time-consuming to gather local information,
and may be very diﬃcult in practice to put pressure on teachers to improve service quality. The
extent to which beneﬁciaries will be able to surmount these diﬃculties is likely to depend on the
characteristics of the community and in particular the dynamics of the relationship between the
people who are beneﬁciaries and the person who is performing the service.
The perception that the advantages of community participation will likely dominate these ob-
stacles is common among many who work in public service in developing countries. The 2004 World
Development Report was devoted to the idea of putting the poor at the center of service provision
with the strong belief that giving parents voice over their children's education, patients a say over
hospital management, making agency budgets transparentall contribute to improving outcomes in
human development. Community-based management policies have been widely adopted through-
out the world over the past decade2. In countries including Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Uganda, and
Burkina Faso, governments and NGOs have organized citizens into multitudes of local committees
for schools, clinics, and local infrastructure, and giving these committees varying levels of power
over resource allocation, monitoring, and management.
Despite the enthusiasm of policymakers for participation programs, the empirical question of
whether, and under what conditions, community participation can improve service quality remains
unresolved. The existing results are mixed and suggest that the success of participatory programs
is highly context dependent. Di Gropello (2006) overviews four school-based management pro-
grams in Latin America and concludes that school-based management models have led generally to
greater community empowerment and teacher eﬀort, resulting in a better use of the existing limited
capacity of teachers and schools, somewhat better student ﬂows and learning outcomes at least
as high as in traditional schools, though the application of the analysis is limited due to possible
selection bias. In India, Banerjee et al (2010) report that providing information to parents about
the role and the activities of school committee and training the community to record educational
performances in the community had no impact on the activity of school committees, and therefore
no impact on education outcomes. In Madagascar, Lassibille et al (2010) ﬁnd that streamlining
management practices combined with facilitating community/school interactions had positive im-
2School-based management programs have been implemented in Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Canada,
Guatemala, Honduras, Hong-Kong, India, Lebanon, Lesotho, Macedonia, Madagascar, Mexico, Nicaragua, the Philip-
pines, Senegal, Serbia, Sri Lanka, the Gambia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Duﬂo et al, 2012).
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pacts on attendance and learning. In addition to the uncertain eﬀect of involving beneﬁciaries in
monitoring schools, there is no evidence (to the best of our knowledge) on how the participation
of parents in school resource management aﬀects behavioral responses to an increase in school re-
sources: do parents keep lowering their eﬀort, or does the responsibility over the resources change
their behavior? How do teachers react to reforms that give parents more power?
This paper makes two contributions. First, it provides evidence on the short-term eﬀect of
an increase in school resources under parental control on parent and teacher behavior, and some
aspects of school quality, using a randomized control trial in Niger. In addition to the average
treatment eﬀect, we explore the role of power imbalances in amplifying or reducing parent and
teacher responses. Second, it provides a theoretical framework that formalizes parent and teacher
behavior in school in order to clarify how a change in school resources (either under teacher or
under parent control) eventually aﬀects school quality, explaining both our results and the existing
results in the literature. This framework also provides some structure for the idea that power
relationships between teachers and communities change behavioral responses and the resulting
eﬃcacy of education policy.
In 2007-2008, the Nigerien Ministry of Education of Niger increased the resources under the
control of the school committees with the aim to increase the quality of education. All school
committees in this experiment had been trained on how to manage schools, and the grant was
planned to increase the capacity of the school committee to undertake actions by increasing the
school committee's resources. We use detailed information on parent contributions to school and
participation in school management, teacher presence in school, school quality and enrollment to
evaluate the impact of the grant. An important limitation of the study is that it provides only
short-term evidence on behavioral responses: the ﬁrst grant arrived late 2007 and was meant to
continue over years, but a political coup occurred in 2009 and both the program and the evaluation
stopped. A survey took place in April-May 2008 and administrative data was collected for 2008-
2009 school year. This paper thus documents the short-term dynamics of an anticipated long-term
program
We ﬁnd an overall positive impact of the grant program on parents' contributions and par-
ticipation in all schools: communities which were given the grant engaged in more nonassertive
participation actions (such as contributing money) and also more assertive actions (such as going
to meetings and managing school supplies). We ﬁnd that in situations where the community has
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more authority, they make more contributions. In addition, we ﬁnd that it is only in schools where
the community has relatively high authority that school committees took charge of monitoring
teacher attendance or sanctioning teachers for absenteeism in response to the grant. Communities
with low authority did not do this at all.
We also observe a small signiﬁcant decrease in teacher eﬀort in response to the grant, which
we attribute to the fact that some teachers have a preference for a centralized government and
might be reluctant to collaborate with parents. At the same time, we ﬁnd that the infrastructure
quality (measured by an index) improved in treatment schools. Finally, we observe an increase in the
demand for education for young pupils. We argue that this supports the idea that increasing parental
participation in school management motivates enrollment, and we provide evidence that some part
of the increased enrollment is due to the practice of participation, rather than to infrastructure
improvements.
There are four key policy implications of our ﬁndings. First, the degree to which outside inputs
are treated as complements, rather than substitutes, to a community's own contributions and
eﬀorts may depend on the degree to which the community has power over the inputs. Second,
parent participation can reduce teacher eﬀort, and some attention should be given to designing
programs with this possible response in mind. Third, programs that encourage communities to
take responsibility for monitoring service providers should take into account whether this is actually
feasible given the power relationships between the community and the service providers. Finally, the
practice of participation can itself be a mechanism to increase service uptake. Our paper is situated
at the intersection of a two strains of literature: the behavioral response of parents and teachers to
educational policies, and the impact of beneﬁciary participation on public service quality.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents some background information on
education in Niger, and describes the school grant experiment. Section 3 presents the data and our
estimation strategy and Section 4 the empirical results. Section 5 presents a model of the dynamics
of school resources, parent and teacher eﬀort in producing education that explains the existing
empirical evidence. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Experimental Set-Up
2.1 Background on Education in Niger
Niger had made remarkable progress in education access in the decade prior to this evaluation:
the number of children enrolled in primary school had more than doubled from 656,000 in 2000 to
1,554,102 in 2008, and net enrollment had risen from 27% to 49% in the same period. However,
only 44% of children who begin primary school ﬁnished all grades, and only 43% of sixth graders
who took the national exam at the end of primary school passed it.3 Literacy rates are low, and
education may be able to substantially improve livelihoods: the World Bank estimates that being
able to read raises a Nigerien person's income by 150% (World Bank, 2010).
In 2006 the Ministry of Education in Niger introduced school committees in all primary public
schools in order to improve quality. These school committees (called the COGES) were designed to
implicate parents and community members in the school, improve accountability, improve manage-
ment, and thus enhance access to and quality of education.4 As discussed in the introduction, the
establishment of local community groups for the purpose of improving public service provision via
community participation is a strategy that many country governments and civil society organiza-
tions advocate. In many respects, the circumstances of Niger make a strong case for school-based
management: low population density, vast distances and limited transportation and information
and communications infrastructure makes supervision of primary schools by the central govern-
ment (or its regional structures) very costly, and the transmission of timely, local information to
the central authorities for planning purposes is challenging.
In the districts where this program was carried out, the COGES were trained in ﬁnancial
management, governance (elections) and project planning - though the training was carried out by
multiple organizations and due to COGES turnover, not all members had been trained. In 2006,
a signiﬁcant number of the newly created and trained school committees were not very actively
engaged in school matters, nor did they develop an school improvement plan for the school year.
3The situation has continued to improve in terms of access to education: in 2011, net enrollment in primary school
was 62%, and primary completion rates had risen to 46%.
4These school committees consist of 6 representatives, including the school director, who serves as secretary,
and parent representatives. The parents are supposed to elect the representatives, who may also be the leaders
of the Parent Association (APE), which includes all parents, and the Mother's Association (AME), which includes
all mothers. In practice, the composition of the COGES varies by school. School committees are supposed to be
responsible for the management of personnel resources (e.g. monitoring of teacher attendance and performance),
ﬁnancial resources (e.g. school meal funds) and material resources (e.g. purchase and management of textbooks,
supplies etc.). One of the school committee's central tasks is the drafting of an annual school improvement plan that
includes its projects, activities, budget, and timelines to guide its work for the school year. The school committee
works parallel to the APE and AME.
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To spur school committee involvement and activity, the Ministry of Education introduced school
grants in order to give the committees an incentive to meet, plan and undertake activities. The
grants were expected to improve school management through increased parental participation and
accountability, to improve school infrastructure and the quality of education, and to potentially
increase enrollment rates. The pilot project was carried out as a randomized evaluation in order to
provide reliable information on impact prior to national scale-up.
2.2 Experimental Design
The evaluation design included 1,000 randomly selected schools in two regions of Niger, Tahoua
and Zinder. One-thousand schools were randomly selected out of the 2,609 total public primary
schools in Zinder and Tahoua. Once these 1,000 schools were determined to be representative of all
the public primary schools in Zinder and Tahoua, half of the 1,000 schools, i.e. 500 schools, were
randomly assigned to receive the grants and became the treatment group. Both randomizations
were stratiﬁed on inspection (a geographical administrative unit), existing support for the school
committee (e.g. from NGOs), and urban versus rural location. The other 500 schools served as
a control group. Data from the Administrative School Census in 2005-2006 (the school census is
described below) was used to conﬁrm balance between control and treatment schools along various
observable characteristics (data from 2006-2007 was not yet available at the time of sampling in
August 2007). Table 1 shows p-values for the test of equality of means across control and treatment,
from which we cannot reject any equality of means.
The size of the grant was based on the size of the school (the number of classrooms), and the
average was $209 per school, or $1.83 per student. On average, the control schools raised a little
over $0.60 per year per student, and so the grant is relatively much larger. For an idea of scale, the
amount of the grant was not, except in the very largest schools, suﬃcient to build an additional
classroom.5
About a month before the grant arrived, all 500 treatment schools (and school committees)
received a general letter informing them of the grant program and its objectives, and the grant
amount allocated to their school. It also included general guidelines on the use of the grants, but
5The school committees selected for treatment received the grants in the last months of 2007 and ﬁrst months of
2008. The grant was a relatively modest amount that was determined by considerations of ﬁnancial sustainability
in view of a potential extension of the program by the government. Note that schools do not, in general, receive
other ﬁnancial transfers from the government. The government does provide material in kind, such as books and
classrooms, and teacher salaries are paid by the government (though payment has been irregular in the past). Some
schools receive support from other community organizations or NGOs, but in general the amount of cash income
available to schools is very small and is obtained through parental contributions.
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the speciﬁc activity to be supported by the grants was decided on by the school committee.6 One
copy of this letter was distributed to the school director and a second copy to the president of the
school committee before the arrival of the grants. As to compliance and program execution, the
grants arrived in 498 schools of the 500 program schools, 492 in the exact amount allocated to them
and six in an diﬀerent amount (see Appendix 3 for further details on compliance).
The school committees used the grants in a variety of ways. Eighty-ﬁve schools were randomly
selected for a detailed questionnaire on grand arrival and spending. The most common use was
material inputs such as construction and oﬃce supplies, and other uses included investment projects,
health and sanitation projects, and transportation. Overall, the largest share of spending of the
grant was in construction. Construction activities included building classrooms, but communities
also constructed lodging for teachers, latrines, school enclosures, and other buildings. Other projects
including electriﬁcation or producing copies of exams were also undertaken. Fourteen percent of
schools surveyed, used at least part of the grant to make loans either to parents, the director, or to
the AME at some interest rate, or purchasing grain for re-sale. It is unclear whether the loans or
small business projects have been proﬁtable.
The program was originally intended to last three years (with three cycles of grant disbursement).
Due to issues with the ﬁnancial transfer mechanism at the central level and the political coup that
happened in 2009, the evaluation was terminated after only one year.
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
3.1 Data
3.1.1 Sources
Data come from two sources: (i) administrative data on primary schools (the Ministry of Education's
annual school census, also called administrative data) and (ii) an evaluation survey administered to
school staﬀ and two members of the school committee at treatment and control schools. The Min-
istry of Education in Niger administers an annual census of all primary schools, including community
schools and medersas (Koranic schools), which provide data on enrollment, teacher characteristics,
school facilities and resources, and community characteristics. In addition to the administrative
data, the Ministry and the World Bank worked with a local NGO to prepare a detailed school survey
6One randomly selected group of schools received a slightly more restrictive list of potential expenditures, and
another group received a warning that their projects might be audited. Analysis of spending patterns did not show
any diﬀerence between these groups.
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to be administered in April/May 2008, ﬁve to six months after grant distribution, to understand
the immediate eﬀects of the grant. This questionnaire included information on school infrastruc-
ture and resources, pupil enrollment and attendance, school improvement plan, school committee
functioning and membership, and school activities. It also asked detailed questions about the level
of education and personal wealth of the school committee members.
3.1.2 Outcomes
To draw general conclusions about the experiment's impact, simplify interpretation, and to guard
against cherry-picking of results, we present ﬁndings for indices that aggregate information over
multiple outcome variables (following Kling et al, 2007). The aggregation also improves statistical
power to detect eﬀects that go in the same direction within a domain. Appendix 4 gives details the
methodology and the composition of the indices used in this paper. Descriptive statistics on parent
actions, infrastructure, and teacher presence in control schools are presented in Table 5 and 6 and
discussed in Appendix 3.
We divide parent participation actions into three types: nonassertive, assertive, and opposi-
tional, because we think that the parents' real authority might have aﬀect these actions diﬀerently.
Nonassertive Parent Actions Nonassertive actions are those which involve the parents either
contributing to the school or executing school policy - that is, they do not require parents to exercise
much authority in decision-making. We use four variables to measure nonassertive actions: ﬁnancial
contributions, a dummy for whether in kind contributions were made7, a dummy for whether the
school committee is in charge of monitoring pupil attendance, and a dummy for whether the school
committee is in charge of sanctioning pupils for poor attendance.
Assertive Parent Actions Assertive actions are those which require the parents to take some
responsibility for and exercise authority in making decisions. We use seven variables to measure
assertive actions: the time elapsed since the last parent and school committee meetings, whether the
mother's association was active or not, and whether the school committee is in charge of collecting
fees, spending fees, supplies and infrastructure.
7It is not feasible to evaluate the amount of in kind contributions as we do not have information on the local
market price of the items contributed.
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Oppositional Parent Actions Oppositional actions are those that require parents not only to
take responsibility for decision-making but also require them to act in opposition to the teachers
(if necessary). We use two variables to measure this (as there are only two, we do not create
an index): a dummy variable for whether the school committee supervises teacher presence, and
a dummy variable for whether the school committee imposes sanctions if teachers are frequently
absent.
Infrastructure The data on infrastructure comes from the 2008/2009 annual administrative
database. We create an index of infrastructure quality using data on the number of buildings,
blackboards, latrines, and books, a dummy for access to water, and a dummy for school enclosure
(this is a fence or wall around the school grounds that separates the school from other public space).
Teacher Presence The unannounced school visit in 2008 recorded how many teachers were
present on the day of the visit, and how many teachers are employed at the school. We use a simple
percentage of the number of teachers who were physically present at the school.8
Demand for Education We have two data points for demand for education. We use the number
of dropouts reported by the school to our surveyors at the April/May 2008 questionnaire, and the
change in enrollment from fall 2007 to fall 2008 reported to the Ministry of Education.
3.1.3 Interaction Variables
The sample size was chosen to be large enough to allow for testing for heterogeneous treatment
eﬀects along community characteristics, one of the initial objectives with this the study. Parents
vary in their capacity to manage school resources wisely and inﬂuence school decisions. This
capacity depends on their power vis-à-vis teachers, or real authority in the terms of Aghion and
Tirole (1997), who underscore the fact that formal authority -the right to make decisions- needs
not imply real authority -eﬀective control over decisions. We test whether real authority is an
important predictor of how eﬀective the increase in school resources under parental control is. The
characteristics that we use in our empirical framework to capture diﬀerences in real authority are
the following:
8Excused absences were counted as absences. If the school was closed on the day of the visit (which was always on
a day that the school was supposed to be open), but data was available on the number of teachers employed there,
all teachers were counted as absent.
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• Education: Education is an important determinant of social status, and may be particularly
so in contexts where the average education levels are low and teachers tend to be respected
members of the community. We deﬁne a community as educated if one or both of the
two interviewed members of the school committee completed primary school (excluding the
director)9
• Wealth: We assume that the wealthier a community is, the more real authority parents will
have because they will have a higher social status relative to the teachers (note that teachers
are relatively homogenous in terms of wealth). The wealth of school committee members is
the ﬁrst component of a principal component analysis of durable goods possessed by the two
interviewed school committee members and the school director. Durable goods include means
of transportation, animals and housing equipment. The wealth of school committee is then
the average of this wealth index for the two interviewed school committee members.
• Teacher Status: In Niger, teachers are either civil servants or contract teachers. Both are
hired and paid by the government (either central or regional) rather than the school. Contract
teachers are generally paid less than civil servants, and the government is able to ﬁre contract
teachers more easily than civil servants. If parents are unsatisﬁed with teacher performance,
they can complain to the district level government, who can then take action against the
teacher more easily if the teacher is a contract teacher than a civil servant. Schools with a
high proportion of civil servant teachers should then have parents with lower real authority.
We measure teacher status by measuring the percent of teachers in a school who are civil
servants. (In Niger about 80% of teachers are contract teachers, and many schools have no
civil servants, including the director).
• The seniority of the school director: We assume that a brand new school director (one who
has recently arrived in a school, regardless of previous posts) is likely to have less power
relative to the community than a school director who has been assigned to (and living in) the
community for many years. The seniority of school director is the number of years that the
school director has been in charge at this speciﬁc school.
• Common language: We assume that if a school director comes from the same ethno-linguistic
9When information for one of the members is missing, we impute the value of the member for whom information is
available, in order to avoid dropping observations. Results do not vary substantially when these schools are excluded
but the sample size is reduced.
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group, he or she is more likely listen to parents and facilitate their participation, and so the
parents will have more authority. We measure common language as a dummy variable, equal
to 1 if the director and the community share a language.
• Authority Factor: The interaction variables are thought to be diﬀerent kinds of measures of
the same underlying trait of latent factor (authority). We attempt to measure this trait by
using a simple principal component analysis with the above variables and predicting the ﬁrst
component.
Summary statistics on these community characteristics are presented in Table 2 and discussed in
Appendix 3.
3.1.4 Attrition
There is some attrition in the datasets. Each year, a handful of schools do not return the adminis-
trative data questionnaire or the questionnaires are improperly ﬁlled out, leading to missing data for
3% of the schools for the infrastructure index and 1.4% of the schools for 2008/09 enrollment. The
April/May 2008 survey was conducted on the basis of unannounced visits, which meant that many
schools were closed. In addition, some schools were not visited due to security concerns, and still
others closed early that year because the summer rainy season began early and so many children
went to the ﬁelds with their parents to plant. As a result, data from the evaluation questionnaire
is available for only 814 schools (81.4%).
We test for diﬀerences by treatment group in the proportion of schools with missing outcome
variables as a whole and sub-divided by district, urban and rural, and whether the school had
external support (for example, NGO sponsorship) prior to the project. Results are reported in
Table 3. 56 t-tests on treatment and interaction between treatment and sub-groups yield two
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences (at the 10% level or higher), which is well within the amount
that would be expected with random attrition. The comparability between treatment and control
groups is thus intact. As to external validity, there are more schools missing in the region where
security was a concern (Tahoua, in the north). In general, larger schools are 5 to 7 percentage
points less likely to be missing data.
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3.2 Empirical Strategy
Local Average Treatment Eﬀect We estimate intent-to-treat eﬀects as measured by the dif-
ferences in the means of school outcomes between schools initially assigned to the treatment group
and schools initially assigned to the control group. Let T be an indicator for treatment group
assignment and let X be a matrix of stratiﬁcation variables. Estimation of the intent-to-treat eﬀect
β is from the following equation:
Yj = βTj +Xjγ + εj (1)
where Yj is the outcome of school j. The covariates (X) are included to improve estimation precision
and include whether the school is urban, the total proportion of girls in 2007/08, the total enrollment
in 2007/08, whether the school was supported by an outside NGO in 2006/07, and the inspection
(a geographic/administrative unit). All regressions use robust standard errors.10 The absolute
magnitudes of the outcomes are in units of outcome's standard deviation, so the estimate shows
the treatment eﬀect in terms of standard deviation units over the control group.
Heterogeneous Treatment Eﬀects Along Community Characteristics In the second step,
we estimate intent-to-treat eﬀects with an interaction term to determine whether the average treat-
ment eﬀect on parent and teacher behavior varies with real authority. We run regressions of the
form:
Yj = βTj + θ(CjTj) + σCj +Xjγ + εj (2)
where Cj denotes a proxy of parents' real authority. In this case θ is the additional (or reduction
of) impact for schools with characteristic Cj . We include an indicator for urban schools and the
interaction of this indicator with the treatment assignment for each characteristic whose correlation
with being located in an urban area is above 0.1, to disentangle the eﬀect of this characteristic from
the eﬀect of being located in an urban area.
10An alternative speciﬁcation uses dummies for the strats used in random selection, which were deﬁned using a
dummy for urban, the total enrollment in 2005/06, and support by an outside NGO in 2005/06. This speciﬁcation
does not substantially change the results, but increases precision of some coeﬃcient estimates and decreases precision
of others.
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Identifying Channels of Impact We generate evidence on channels of impact on demand for
education by including the potential channel in the regression of treatment on the outcome, and
observing the change in the coeﬃcient on treatment. We estimate the following equation:
Yj = β2Tj + φCj +Xjγ + εj (3)
where Cj is the channel variable, and compare β2 to β generated by equation (5). A reduction
in the point value for β when the channel variable is included is evidence that some of the variation
in Yj which was due to variation in Tj is accounted for by the variation in Cj . Put diﬀerently, a
reduction in the coeﬃcient on treatment when the channel variable is added is consistent with the
hypothesis that some of the impact ﬂows through that channel.
The interpretation of the information derived from this tests is limited by the caveat we cannot
be sure that there is not another unmeasured channel which is correlated both to a measured
channel and to the outcome. However, this test provides suggestive evidence of the mechanism of
impact.
4 Results
4.1 Eﬀect of Grants on Parent Participation in Monitoring Schools
We ﬁnd evidence that school committee grants increase parent participation in schools and that this
increase consistently varies with parents' real authority (although some estimates are imprecise).
Nonassertive Actions Table 7 shows the impact of grants on nonassertive actions. The overall
eﬀect of grants is that parents increased their involvement in the school in nonassertive activities.
The mean of the treatment group is 0.14 standard deviations above the mean of the control group
for the index of supportive actions, signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The analysis of the component
variables (funds collected per pupil, in kind donations, pupil attendance supervision and sanction)
show that most of this overall eﬀect comes from an increase in parental contributions to schools11,
which is 0.48 standard deviations higher in the treatment group than in the control group. This
represents an average increase in parental contributions of $0.50 per pupil for a grant of $1.83 per
pupil, which means that parents supplemented 27% of the grant value. This result contrasts with
11Table A1 gives the impact of the program for the components of the index.
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previous studies showing that parents decreased their contributions in response to an increase in
school resources (Das et al., 2010; Pop-Eleches and Urquiola, 2012)12 .
The impact is signiﬁcantly larger when the school committee members are more educated: the
interaction term between education and treatment is 0.07, signiﬁcant at the 10% level, meaning
that educated parents supplemented more the grant than non-educated parents.
Assertive actions The impact of grants on assertive actions is reported in Table 8. The overall
eﬀect of grants is positive: the mean index of the treatment group is about 0.08 standard deviations
above the mean of the control group. The analysis of detailed variables composing the index shows
a 27% increase in the proportion of school committees in charge of collecting fees (from 30% to
38%), or a 18% increase in the proportion of mothers' associations with active status13 (from 27%
to 32%). We also observe a ﬁve percent increase in the frequency of parental association and school
committee meetings and on the responsibility of infrastructure.14 None of these eﬀects on the
index components are statistically signiﬁcant (although some of them are very close to conventional
signiﬁcance), while the eﬀect on the index itself is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
The average treatment eﬀect does not vary signiﬁcantly with community characteristics.
Oppositional Actions There is no overall impact on teacher supervision or sanction for teacher
absence (Tables 9 and 10). However, consistent with the model, only communities where the
school committees were educated increased their supervision of teacher attendance (Table 8), and
only communities with a higher Authority Factor increased their sanctioning for teacher absence.
Educated school committees are 4 percentage points more likely to supervise teacher presence if the
school was treated (77% in the control group versus 81% in the treatment group, or 0.13 standard
deviations), signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The coeﬃcient on the interaction between authority and
treatment on sanctioning teachers for absenteeism is positive (6 percentage points) and signiﬁcant
at the 10% level.
We consider this empirical test as a ﬁrst attempt to formally take into account real authority
and the results as suggestive enough to encourage further tests on more heterogenous samples. Our
12An alternative interpretation would be that this result derives from the fact that we measure only the ﬁrst year
of the grant, and so parents did not have time to change their own contribution of inputs (see Das et al, 2011, where
crowding out was greater when a school grant was anticipated than when it was unanticipated). We think this is
unlikely since the parents did respond by changing their contribution to the school, and they responded by increasing
their contributions to support school projects. In addition, parents were notiﬁed in advance of the grants arrival.
13This data comes from a question on the annual administrative survey where schools are asked to indicate whether
the mothers' association is active or not.
14Table A2 gives the impact of the program for components of the index.
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ﬁnding that the impact of the school committee grant program varies with parents' real authority
echoes other existing results in the literature: Duﬂo, Dupas and Kremer (2012) ﬁnd that giving
parents the responsibility over an extra-teacher led to a reduction in eﬀort from civil-service teachers
and, crucially, that a training to empower the parents helped mitigate this reduction. In Gambia,
Blimpo and Evans (2011) studied a training for school committees in school management, combined
with a grant to initiate activities. This project increased parent participation and pupil attendance,
and decreased teacher absenteeism, but had no impact on learning except when the school committee
members were educated. Pradhan et al. (2011) report on a ﬁeld experiment in Indonesia using
also the combination of a training and a grant to encourage school committees to participate in
school management. This policy increased parent participation and learning only when combined
with an intervention fostering the ties between the school committee and a local governing body.
Gunnarsson et al (2009) use data from eight Latin American countries to show that parent eﬀort (as
well as principal eﬀort and material infrastructure) is more related to parents' human capital and
the size and remoteness of individual communities, as opposed to the de jure policies implemented
by the diﬀerent country governments. Studying four case studies of parent empowerment through
School Site Councils in the United States, Gershberg and Shatkin (2007) give suggestive evidence
that a condition for parent empowerment to improve school quality, school-community relations
and community organizational capacity is that the institutional context gives parents enough real
authority. Communities may lack the necessary capacity to eﬀectively plan or monitor teachers,
and so decentralization of school management may increase inequality by primarily beneﬁting the
better oﬀ and leaving the poor behind (Galiani et al, 2008). As King and Ozler (2004) demonstrate,
policies of de jure autonomy do not always lead to de facto autonomy, and so participation may
not be meaningful if communities have no actual power.
4.2 Eﬀects of Grants on School Infrastructure
As shown in Table 11, we ﬁnd that in the slightly longer term (one year after the treatment) there is
a small improvement in the infrastructure index of schools: a 0.04 standard deviation increase in the
index for infrastructure quality. This is largely driven by increases in the number of classrooms and
the construction of walls around the compound.15 The increase in the number of new classrooms
amounts to 0.12 of a standard deviation, representing an additional 0.09 new classrooms per school
15These items were projects that were frequently reported by the schools as projects undertaken using the grant
money.
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in the treatment group over 0.23 new classrooms per school in the control group (a 39% increase).
The increase in the proportion of schools with walls around the compound (enclosure) amounts
to 0.18 of a standard deviation, with 9 percentage points more in the treatment group over 34%
in the control group (a 26% increase). We should recall that we have found that the grant was
supplemented by parents in terms of ﬁnancial contributions and in-kind help, so the increase in the
material quality derives from both the increased ﬁnancial parent contributions and the grant itself.
4.3 Eﬀects of Grants on Teacher Presence
We ﬁnd a decrease in teacher presence in the treatment group: around 4 percentage points on an
average of 76% presence in the control group, signiﬁcant at the 10% level (Table 12). The interaction
terms do not reveal any meaningful heterogeneity. Teachers thus responded to increased resources
under the control of parents with a reduction in their own inputs. Feedback from the ﬁeld revealed
that those teachers with a centralized view of government were resentful, while those who had
worked with communities were open to the idea. This ﬁnding echoes the result found by Duﬂo,
Dupas and Kremer (2012) in Kenya where giving parents the responsibility over an extra-teacher
led to a reduction in eﬀort from civil-service teachers. All in all, it is interesting that additional
resources under parental control increased parents' eﬀort but decreased teachers' eﬀort, whereas
Das et al. (2010) and Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2012) ﬁnd that additional resources out of parental
control decreased parent's eﬀort (they do not observe the eﬀect on teachers' eﬀort). The model we
propose in section 5 will make all these results consistent.
4.4 Eﬀects of Grants on Demand for Education
The grant program increased demand for education for children in the ﬁrst and second year of
primary school. Table 13 reports on pupil dropouts and Table 14 reports the impact of grants on
pupil enrollment in 2008/09. Younger pupils exhibit fewer dropouts at the end of 2007-2008 for
pupils in Grade 1: the dropout rate for grade 1 was 1 percentage point lower in treatment schools
(2% versus 3%), signiﬁcant at the 10% level. These ﬁndings are supported by higher enrollment the
next year, in 2008-2009, in Grade 2. There were slightly more than 3 additional pupils in grade 2,
up from a control group average of 30 pupils, signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The grant thus increased
school participation for the youngest pupils.
The fact that the demand increases for youngest pupils suggests that the demand for education
17
is more elastic when the child is young, which is consistent with the two classical ideas that the
beneﬁt of enrollment is lower when the child is older, and that the cost of education increases
when the child gets older, especially because of opportunity cost of time of elder children. It is
therefore not surprising to observe a higher elasticity of demand for educating young children than
for educating elder children.16
4.5 Channels of Impact on Demand
Table 15 reports the test for channels of the impact on demand, with three channels which showed
signiﬁcant overall treatment impacts: nonassertive action, assertive action, and infrastructure qual-
ity. The outcome is the number of pupils enrolled in second grade in the fall of 2008/2009. We
avoid confounding a decrease in the coeﬃcient on treatment by comparing the coeﬃcient of the
regression with the channel to the coeﬃcient of the regression without the channel but restricted
to the sample that has data for the respective channel.
Adding the index of nonassertive action reduces the coeﬃcient on treatment by 20% (column
3), adding the index of assertive action reduces the coeﬃcient on treatment by 10% (column 5),
and adding the index of infrastructure reduces the coeﬃcient on treatment by 4%. The highest
reduction in the coeﬃcient on treatment comes when both the index of contribution and the index of
management are included (28%). Including the index of infrastructure never reduces the coeﬃcient
on treatment by more than 3%.
These results suggest that some of the increase in demand is ﬂowing from the increase in parental
participation in school activities and not from the increase in material quality.17 This eﬀect could be
due to an informational eﬀect (better informed parents get a larger beneﬁt of enrolling their child) or
a psychological eﬀect of participating (involved parents have less problems with procrastination and
are more pro-active). Policies to foster parent participation might thus help advance two diﬀerent
goals: improving the quality of schools and increasing demand for education.
16We also take the fact that only younger grades were impacted as evidence that the change in enrollment is not
due to intentional misreporting by grant schools. In addition, the ﬁnding is replicated across two diﬀerent types of
data collections and at two diﬀerent periods.
17While we are conﬁdent that the impact ﬂows through the channel of increased parent participation, we cannot
exclude the possibility that the channel for increased demand is not related to some quality measure which is changed
by parent participation and which we do not measure (for example, perhaps parents demanded that teachers stop
using corporal punishment, which we do not measure).
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5 Model
In this section, we consider a model that formalizes the behavioral responses of parents and teachers
to a change in school resources and the resulting eﬀect on school quality. The motivation for this
model is two-fold. First, the model helps to clarify how the grant program studied in this paper
can aﬀect parent participation, teacher eﬀort and school quality. Second, we want to show that
reasonable assumptions on school dynamics are able to produce predictions consistent with the
evidence found in the literature.
Albornoz et al (2011) model the interaction between student, parent and teacher investments and
school resources, to explain the ambiguous eﬀect of resources on parent involvement at home. This
model suggests that under some circumstances, an increase in school resources generate a decline
in parent investment in education at home. Das and al (2011) also provide a model to explain the
decrease in parental eﬀort at home in response to an increase in school resources. But none of these
theoretical frameworks take into account parental participation in school. The model proposed in
this paper enriches our understanding of school dynamics by taking into account parents' eﬀort
both at home and at school, which enlarges the set of interventions of interest and adds to our
understanding of the eﬀects of educational policies.
5.1 Set-Up
The model involves three participants: parents, teachers and the government. Teachers decide
how much time they put in teaching tt. Parents decide how much time they invest for education
at home th, as well as how much time they participate in school management tp. Finally, the
government chooses the level of governmental resources for the school, which decompose in two
parts, Gt + Gp, where Gt is resources in the hands of school staﬀ (principals and teachers), while
Gp is governmental resources for the school under the control of parents (typically, resources handled
by the school committee).
Here, participation in school management refers to the many diﬀerent kinds of participation
that policy makers envision, where beneﬁciaries might be organized into committees, undertake
projects themselves, such as construction or sanitation, raise funds, provide personal contributions,
supervise, hire, and even ﬁre teachers, engage in awareness campaigns, provide advice to staﬀ, and




Children's learning E is the addition of learning produced at home and learning produced at school.
Learning produced at home Learning produced at home is assumed proportional to the num-
ber of hours parents devote to education at home, th (making sure kids get up on time and go
to school or investing in private lessons, for instance). How much each hour spent on education
translates into learning depends on parent's productivity at producing learning, denoted e, reﬂect-
ing for instance parents' level of education (more educated parents produce more learning for each
hour spent on helping with homework) or parents' hourly wage (a higher wage can pay for a higher
amount of private lessons for each working hour invested in education). Learning produced at home
is thus eth.
Learning produced at school Learning produced at school is proportional to the time teachers
spend at school, tt. How much each hour spent at school translates into learning depends on teach-
ers' productivity, which results from school resources. Indeed, school resources encompass salaries
(which should reﬂect both class size and teachers' quality) and school materials (infrastructure,
textbooks, ﬂip charts, blackboard, etc.) that allow teachers for producing more learning for the
same amount of time spent with the children. So we assume that the level of resources is a factor
of teachers' productivity.
Furthermore, we assume that parents' participation in school management interfere with school
resources in the determination of teachers' productivity. Indeed, parents' participation is additional
resources: parents raise funds from the community, and do administrative tasks that allow teachers
for focusing on teaching and producing more learning for the same amount of time spent at school.
Moreover, parents' participation should increase the allocative eﬃciency of school resources by
preventing rent capture and making expenses closer to educational needs and common interest
(Barrera-Osorio et al, 2009). We thus assume that parents' time spent on school management,
ts, is a factor that increase the eﬀect of resources on teachers' productivity. This factor apply to
resources under parental control, Gp, but not on Gt in which parents do not have a say.
We thus assume that learning produced at school is given by (Gt + tpGp)tt and total learning
is given by E = eth + (Gt + tpGp)tt.
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Parents' Utility
Parents' utility is the diﬀerence between the beneﬁt they derive from children' learning E, and the
opportunity cost of the time they spend on producing learning, th + tp. The beneﬁt from children'
learning is assumed concave in E (for instance ln(1 + E)), so that learning produced at home and
learning produced at school are technical substitute. The cost of time is assumed linear (for instance
th + tp), so parents' utility is given by:
Up = ln(1 + eth + (Gt + tpGp)tt)− th − tp (4)
Teachers' Utility
Similarly, teachers' utility is the diﬀerence between the beneﬁt they derive from children' learning
and the opportunity cost of their time. We assume that teachers' beneﬁt and cost take the same
form as parents' ones, except that their welfare is also inﬂuenced by parents' participation in
school management: teachers derive a beneﬁt from parents' satisfaction towards their production of
learning when parents can observe this production. This beneﬁt takes the form of a social reward18
that is proportional to the time teachers devote to school, with a factor of parents' participation:
the more parents participate, the more they observe and reward each unit of time teachers devote
to education.
However, teachers who have a preference for a centralized government might resent being mon-
itored by parents because of the resulting loss of autonomy and leadership in school decisions. In
this case, the eﬀect of parents' participation on teachers' welfare can be negative, teachers' loss
of welfare being also proportional to the time they devote to education, with a factor of parents'
participation (the more devoted they are and the more parents participate, the more teachers are
resentful). We denote δ teachers' taste for community participation in school management. A
negative δ reﬂects a preference for a centralized government, whereas a positive δ reﬂects openness
to collaborate with parents (a δ close to zero would reﬂect teachers' indiﬀerence).
As a result, teachers' utility is given by:
Ut = ln(1 + eth + (Gt + tpGp)tt)− tt + δtptt (5)
18An equivalent way to put it is that teachers incur a social sanction from the community if they shirk and if
parents can observe it.
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5.2 Parents' and Teachers' Choices
The ﬁrst-order condition for the teachers' problem is suﬃcient (Ut is inﬁnitively diﬀerentiable and










For the parents, the ﬁrst-order conditions are also suﬃcient and give the optimal choices:
th = max
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From the expression of tp, we see that parents invest more time in school management when
resources under their control increase and when teachers make more eﬀort. In contrast, parents
invest less time in school management when resources in the hands of teachers increase, when they
spend more time for education at home and when their eﬃciency with education at home increase.
Symmetrically, parents devote more eﬀort for education at home when their eﬃciency at home
increases, whereas they reduce eﬀort at home when school resources increase, or when teachers' or
their own eﬀort at school increase.
Finally, teachers increase time they spend at school when school resources increase, whereas they
reduce it when parents' eﬀort or eﬃciency at home increase. However, the response of teachers to an
increase in parents' participation in school management is ambiguous: if δ is positive, the response
is clearly positive too: teachers spend more time at school. But in the region where δ is negative,
for large absolute value of δ, the response is negative, meaning that teachers who have a strong
preference for a centralized government reduce time at school when parents' participation in school
management increases.
5.3 Heterogenous Best-Responses
For the best clarity and simplicity, the model above just includes the main dynamics in the school
system. In this paper, we also explore the possibility that power imbalances are likely to induce
diﬀerent choices. This section explicit how parental real authority inﬂuences parents' and teachers'
decision.
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In our model, real authority of parents over the school would be captured by a parameter θ
multiplying parents' time spent in school management: learning produced at school is given by
(Gt + θtpGp)tt, reﬂecting the fact that more powerful parents make better use of resources under
their control, therefore extracting more learning from teachers for each hour invested in school than
weak parents. Also, it should be noticed that real authority of parents θ is unlikely to be orthogonal
to teachers' preference for a centralized government δ. On the one hand, teachers are more likely
to resent being monitored by parents when teachers enjoy a high social status relative to parents,
for instance when parents have a low if not no education, which is likely to coincide with parents'
lack of real authority. On the other hand, teachers' preference for a centralized government largely
determines the extent to which parents entitled to participate in school (have formal authority) are
involved in decision making (have real authority). We thus posit that δ = δ(θ) with δ′ > 0. The
best-responses with a parameter θ reﬂecting real authority are: th = max
{





1− GtθGp − eth+1θttGp , 0
}
and tt = max
{
1
1−δ(θ)tp − eth+1Gt+θtpGp , 0
}
.
Eﬀect of real authority on parents' and teachers' decisions Since their participation at
school is more productive, parents with higher θ invest more time in school management and less
time at home than parents with low θ. Teachers also invest more time at school because their
productivity is fostered by parents' real authority. Moreover, the likelihood of δ being negative is
lower when parents' real authority is larger, which adds to the general positive eﬀect of parents'
real authority on teachers' eﬀort.
Eﬀect of real authority on parents' and teachers' responses Parents' response to an in-
crease in teachers' eﬀort or in resources under their control is ampliﬁed by real authority, just as
teachers' response to an increase in resources under parental control. Moreover, teachers' response
to an increase in parent's participation in school management is reduced in the negative region and
ampliﬁed in the positive region by real authority. These predictions are consistent with the evidence
presented in section 4.1 that the beneﬁts of community-based interventions are larger when parents
are more powerful.
5.4 The Eﬀect of an Increase in School Resources
In the light of this model, what is the eﬀect of an increase in governmental resources to schools?
In the short run, parents won't take into account the fact that teachers will also react to the
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changing conditions (and reciprocally). We thus consider that parents take the teachers' actions
as given (ﬁxed for instance at their past value) and vice-versa, and we determine the comparative
statics and discuss the predicted behavioral trajectories. Our interest for short term responses is
because most empirical framework in the literature provides short-term responses and that real-life
behavioral adjustments seem slow. Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2012) show that responses after one
year are diﬀerent from responses in the longer run, reﬂecting the fact that it takes quite a long time
for parents to adjust their behavior to others' actions.19
Eﬀect in the absence of parents' participation in school
In the short run, an increase in school resources increase teachers' time at school and decrease
parents' time for education at home. The fact that parents devote less time for education at home
tends to reinforce teachers' response, which comfort parents with investing less time at home, etc.
The long-term eﬀect of an increase in school resources is thus clear-cut: teachers respond positively
while parents respond negatively. The ﬁnal impact on school quality is a mixed bag: the increase in
school resources and teachers' response tend to improve education outcomes, while parents' response
tend to reduce this eﬀect. Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (forthcoming) and Das et al. (2010) conﬁrm
that an increase in school resources reduced parents' eﬀort (they do not observe teachers' response).
In our framework, this policy is appropriate in contexts where (i) teachers actually use resources
for educational purpose, and (ii) the eﬀect of additional resources on teachers' productivity is large.
The conditions of success of this policy are thus a sound institutional environment preventing rent
capture and an initial level of school resources at which marginal gains of productivity are steep20.
Eﬀect in contexts where parents participate in school
Teachers' and parents' responses to an increase in school resources are the same as above, but now
parents' re-optimize their level of participation in school management too.
19There are multiple reasons for long run adjustment. For instance, parents may not realize that teachers incur
a loss of welfare from collaborating with them (formally, they have a imperfect perception of teachers' δ) because
teachers do not disclose their reluctance to collaborate with parents in front of them (because it would be rude).
It is also possible that parents do not take into account what they observe in the short run because they expect
continuous collaboration to make δ become positive in the future.
20This analysis would beneﬁt from evidence on the shape of teachers' productivity as a function of school resources
to know which kind of regions would experience the larger gains in teachers' productivity. If this function is concave
(resp. convex, S-shaped), gains in teachers' productivity are larger at the bottom (resp. top, middle) part of school
resource distribution.
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Increase in Gt If the additional resources fall in the hands of teachers, parents decrease their
participation at school. This in turn aﬀects teachers' eﬀort in a way which depends on teachers'
preference for a centralized government: if teachers prefer a centralized government, the decrease in
parents' participation in school management ampliﬁes teachers' positive response to the increase in
school resources, so teachers make unambiguously more eﬀort. In contrast, if teachers are motivated
by the collaboration with parents, the decrease in parents' participation reduces their incentive to
work hard and the policy brings a smaller beneﬁt. The conditions of success of this policy are thus
(i), (ii), plus the condition that (iii) teachers prefer a centralized government. France is an example
of countries where this policy is likely to work well.
Increase in Gp If the additional resources fall in the hands of parents, parents increase their
participation at school, which leads to the opposite situation in which teachers invest unambiguously
more eﬀort when teachers are motivated by the collaboration with parents through three positive
eﬀects: the eﬀects of additional resources and of parents' participation in the management of the
resources on their productivity, and the incentive produced by the social reward. When teachers
prefer a centralized government, parents' participation creates a burden for teachers which reduces
teachers' eﬀort in a way that might be strong enough to oﬀset teachers' positive response to school
resources and to parents' management of the resources. In the long-run, this should eventually
discourage parents to participate at school and encourage investment for education at home back
up, but in the short-run concurrent increase in parents' participation in school management and
decrease in teachers' eﬀort can be observed, as Duﬂo, Dupas and Kremer (2012) ﬁnd in Kenya. Our
empirical results are also consistent with the situation where teachers' preference for a centralized
government is strong and parents' real authority is weak, resulting in a negative short-term impact
of parents' participation in school on teachers' eﬀort. The impact on school quality can be at risk
since the positive eﬀects of school resources and parents' management of the resources are mitigated
by a double decrease in parents' eﬀort at home and teachers' eﬀort at school.
When parents have a large real authority θ, the positive eﬀect of parents' management of the
resources is larger so parents' response is larger too, which is consistent with our empirical ﬁndings
that parents contribute more and participate more in school management when they have more
authority. The larger eﬀect on parents' participation combined with the smaller likelihood of a
preference for a centralized government leads to a more favorable teachers' response. Our data
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do not conﬁrm this prediction, but Duﬂo, Dupas and Kremer (2012) do since they observe that
parents' empowerment through school committee training reduced the negative response of civil-
servant teachers.
Acording to this framework, the conditions of success of this policy are thus (i), (ii), plus
the conditions that (iii) teachers are keen to collaborate with parents, and (iv) parents have real
authority on teachers. These conditions are more likely to hold in countries where the social gap
between parents and teachers is small and where the education system is decentralized. The USA
is an example of countries where this policy is likely to work well, whereas Niger and Kenya are not
the ideal contexts for encouraging parental control over school management since (iii) and (iv) do
not hold. However, one might argue that the short-term negative impact on teachers' eﬀort is the
price to pay for potential longer-term positive eﬀect -which our results cannot exclude.
The general picture supported by existing empirical evidence and explained by our model is
three-fold: ﬁrst, an increase in school resources out of parental control tends to decrease parental
eﬀort. Second, an increase in school resources under parental control tends to increase parental
eﬀort. Finally, the size of the increase in parental eﬀort and of the resulting eﬀect on teachers'
eﬀort depends on power imbalances in school: the higher parents' real authority, the larger their
response and the resulting increase in teacher's eﬀort, with a risk of adverse eﬀects in contexts
where parents are weak. This paper is a ﬁrst step that uses both formal tests and intuition to build
a narrative about community participation in resource management. Our hope is that future work
might build on this model to provide additional insights and rigorous empirical tests.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that increasing the ﬁnancial resources under the oﬃcial control of
parents increased participation along several dimensions. In particular, parents readily engaged in
activities that support the school and supplement the grant with their own inputs. Parents also
engaged in activities that help the school staﬀ manage the school. However, parents who are less
educated responded less, both in terms of actions that directly oppose to the teachers and in terms
of actions that do not, and teachers overall decreased their presence at school. These ﬁndings point
to the sensitive nature of power dynamics in schools and add to our understanding of the often
disappointing eﬀects of education policies (especially in weak institutional contexts). In contrast,
we ﬁnd increases in children participation in school, which we partially attribute to their parents'
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practice of participation in school management -in contrast to improvement in school quality. This
ﬁnding indicates that the beneﬁt of involving parents in school should not only be assessed in the
light of service quality, but also in the light of demand for service uptake.
Extrapolating from the speciﬁc case of schools, there are three major policy implications of
this paper. First, it may not be inevitable that decentralizing ﬁnancial resources from the central
government to local communities will crowd out local contributions, if there is concurrent involve-
ment of the communities and communities are given actual ownership of the transferred resources.
Second, the type of participation envisioned by a participation program should take into account
the characteristics of the community from whom this eﬀort is being asked, in particular the power
dynamics between the person providing the public service and the people beneﬁting from it. For
many observers this ﬁnding will likely seem self-evident, yet there continues to be a mismatch be-
tween the actions requested of communities and their ability to carry out these actions. This paper
provides a theoretical and empirical basis for increasing attention to this aspect of program design.
Third, the evidence in this paper supports the idea that the act of participation itself can increase
uptake of services, independent of improvements in quality, perhaps through increased familiarity
with the public service institution or through nudges to overcome procrastination.
There are several possibilities for further work. First, this model could be tested using alternative
data sources (many empirical surveys have been carried out on participation programs in diﬀerent
sectors and diﬀerent contexts). Second, this model might be adapted to give a more complete
picture of the dynamics behind participation. In particular, it may be interesting to account for
more subtle or intangible beneﬁts from participating as reputation or altruism, and free-riding. It
would also be interesting to unpack the feedback between participation and demand to know how
feelings of ownership might enter into the community dynamics.
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Figure 1: Reported Use of Grant Money, by Total Amount Spent
Source: Financial Control over 85 randomly selected schools
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Table 1: Pre-program School Characteristics, by Treatment Group
Variable   Treatment Control   p-value 
      
Number of schools  500 500   
      
Pupils      
Enrollment*  142 150  0,28
% girls*  0,39 0,39  0,97
      
Location      
Urban/Rural  0,11 0,11  0,92
Tahoua  0,52 0,51  0,85
Distance to inspection  36,41 36,27  0,94
Distance to health 
center  8,97 8,46  0,71
      
Infrastructure      
Teachers**  3,13 3,15  0,88
Classrooms**  2,88 2,95  0,63
Latrines**  0,16 0,17  0,93
Water**  0,1 0,08  0,41
Electricity**  0,01 0,01  0,97
      
Test score      
Grade 6 exam rate**  0,69 0,71  0,48
      
School Committees      
School Committee exists** 0,91 0,93  0,22
Supported**  0,58 0,59  0,85
            
P-values are for tests of equality of the means across groups  
* Indicates data is from 2007/08    
* Indicates data is from 2005/06    
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Table 2: Community Characteristics, by Treatment Group
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Control Treatment Difference p-value
% Girls in 2007/08 1000 0,39 0,11 0,39 0,39 0,00 0,97
Education of school committee 739 0,31 0,46 0,32 0,31 0,01 0,00
% of teachers that are civil servants 765 0,20 0,21 0,20 0,20 0,00 0,73
Seniority of the school Director (years) 720 4,16 2,68 4,22 4,10 0,12 0,53
Distance from households to school (1-5) 768 1,22 0,49 1,19 1,25 -0,06 0,07
Average wealth of school committee (PCA index) 718 -0,63 1,46 -0,59 -0,67 0,09 0,42
Director speaks same language (0/1) 709 0,82 0,39 0,82 0,81 0,01 0,70
Source: School survey conducted April-May 2008, except % of girls in 2007/08: 2007/08 administrative data.
Observations at school level. P-values are for tests of equality of the means across Treatment and Control.
Education of school committee=1 if at least one member completed primary school.
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Table 3: Attrition, by Treatment Group and Pre-Program School Characteristics
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics - Parent Participation in Control Group Schools
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics - Infrastructure and Teacher Presence in Control Group Schools
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics - Demand for Education in Control Group Schools
Enrollment 2008/09
N mean sd mean sd mean sd
Number of pupils in school register - Grade 1 493 22 19 18 16 40 33
Number of pupils in school register - Grade 2 493 17 19 13 15 30 32
Number of pupils in school register - Grade 3 493 14 17 9 12 24 27
Number of pupils in school register - Grade 4 493 16 17 10 12 26 27
Number of pupils in school register - Grade 5 493 13 15 8 10 21 24
Number of pupils in school register - Grade 6 493 12 13 7 10 19 21
Number of pupils in school register - Total 493 95 71 66 57 160 123
Sample: Control group schools. Sample size may differ due to missing data.  
Dropouts Spring 2008
N mean sd mean sd mean sd
% of pupils dropped at visit - Grade 1 271 0,03 0,11 0,03 0,11 0,03 0,10
% of pupils dropped at visit - Grade 2 227 0,03 0,11 0,04 0,15 0,03 0,11
% of pupils dropped at visit - Grade 3 269 0,03 0,09 0,03 0,09 0,03 0,08
% of pupils dropped at visit - Grade 4 236 0,03 0,11 0,04 0,13 0,04 0,11
% of pupils dropped at visit - Grade 5 211 0,03 0,11 0,04 0,13 0,03 0,10
% of pupils dropped at visit - Grade 6 243 0,05 0,11 0,05 0,15 0,05 0,10
Sample: Control group schools. Sample size may differ due to missing data.  
Data Source:School survey conducted in April-May 2008





Table 7: The Impact of Grants on Parent Nonassertive Action
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Table 8: The Impact of Grants on Parent Assertive Actions
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Table 9: The Impact of Grants on Supervision of Teacher Attendance
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Table 10: The Impact of Grants on Sanction for Poor Teacher Attendance
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Table 11: The Impact of Grants on School Infrastructure
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Table 12: The Impact of Grants on Teacher Presence
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Table 13: The Impact of Grants on the Demand for Education: Percent of students enrolled in
fall 2007 who dropped out by spring 2008
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Table 14: The Impact of Grants on the Demand for Education: Enrollment
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Table 15: Channel of the Eﬀect on the Demand for Education: Participation or Infrastructure?
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Appendix 1: Compliance with Study Protocol
The school committees, i.e. two representatives, signed a document conﬁrming eﬀective receipt
of the grant in the intended amount. These receipts were ﬁrst collected at the regional level and
the information was then entered into a database at the Ministry of Education as a way to verify
the actual receipt of the grants at the school level. An additional survey was conducted in 85
randomly selected schools asking detailed questions about the receipt and spending of the grants,
and ﬁnancial management. This questionnaire also included information about any problems with
the administration of the grant and qualitative feedback and suggestions from the COGES. The
use of the grants was recorded in detail, including the existence of a receipt for each expenditure.
Grants were distributed as follows: the Ministry of Education issued an order to the District
level, which allowed the district to withdraw cash from the Treasury to distribute to the schools.
The grants were distributed ﬁrst to the inspectors, and then either directly to the COGES or to
other oﬃcials who brought the grants to the schools. The vast majority of schools do not have bank
accounts, and other mechanisms of distribution were infeasible.
The collection of grant receipts, ﬁnancial questionnaires, and information from the Ministry
indicated that of the 498 of the 500 treatment schools received the grant. Of the two that did not
receive their grant, one school had closed, and so their grant was allocated to a school outside of the
1,000 school sample, and the other's grant was mistakenly given to a control school. Of the schools
receiving the grant, our information indicates that four schools received less money than had been
allocated to them (in 3 cases the schools recieved 500 FCFA less than the assigned grant amount
of 73,500 FCFA, and in one case 10,500 FCFA less than the assigned grant amount of 120,500
FCFA), while two schools reported receiving more than had been allocated (one school recieved
2,000 FCFA more than the assigned amount of 122,500 FCFA, and the other received 27,000 FCFA
more than the assigned amount of 167,500 FCFA). All in all, the data indicate that 492 out of 500
schools received the exact amount allocated to them, and six others received the grant but not in
the correct amount. This is a reasonably high compliance rate21.
Data from the qualitative questionnaire administered to the 85 randomly selected schools indi-
cate that the majority of those schools received the intended grant amount22.
21Note that this program was publicized within the administration and careful records were required at each step
of transfer of the money. In addition, the government of Niger had recently publicly cracked down on corrupt oﬃcials.
This suggests that applications of this transfer mechanisms to other contexts might not be so eﬀective.
22Among the 85 schools, one school that had been selected for the grant had been closed at the time that the
grant arrived. In another case, the grant was accidentally given to another school. In a third case, a school reported
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Appendix 2: Description of Indices
The summary index Y is deﬁned to be the equally weighted average of z-scores of its components,
with the sign of each measure oriented so that more beneﬁcial outcomes have higher scores. The
z-scores are calculated by subtracting the control group mean and dividing by the control group
standard deviation. Thus, each component of the index has mean 0 and standard deviation 1
for the control group. If an individual has a valid response to at least one component measure
of an index, then any missing values for other component measures are imputed at the random
assignment group mean. This results in diﬀerences between treatment and control means of an
index being the same as the average of treatment and control means of the components of that
index (when the components are divided by their control group standard deviation and have no
missing value imputation), so that the index can be interpreted as the average of results for separate
measures scaled to standard deviation units. The resulting estimate gives location of the mean of
the treatment group in the distribution of the control group in terms of standard deviation units.
We create three indices:
• Two indices reﬂecting diﬀerent kinds of parent participation:
 The nonassertive index averages together four variables: parent ﬁnancial and in-kind
contributions, and parent supervision of pupil attendance and parent remedial action for
pupil absenteeism.
 The assertive index averages together seven variables: frequency of parent association
and school committee meetings, whether the mothers' association is active, and whether
the school committee is in charge of collecting fees, deciding how fees are spent, super-
vising infrastructure, and supervising supplies.
• An index of school quality:
 The infrastructure index is composed of the number of buildings, blackboards, latrines,
and books, a dummy for access to water, and a dummy for school enclosure (this is a fence
or wall around the school grounds that separates the school from other public space).
The data on infrastructure comes from the 2008/2009 annual administrative database
receiving 500 FCFA less than the intended amount. Two schools reported paying some money to cover transport
costs to the person who delivered the grant.
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so we can evaluate the impact of the grant in the middle run (around 10 months after
the treatment).
Table A1: Impact of Treatment on Components of Nonassertive Index
Table A2: Impact of Treatment on Components of Assertive Index
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Appendix 3: Descriptive Statistics
Community Characteristics
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics on the community authority that we use as interactions with the
treatment variable to test for heterogenous treatment eﬀects of the program. These statistics are
from the 2008 school survey and from the 2007/2008 administrative survey database. It is highly
unlikely that these characteristics changed because of the treatment over the experiment period
(December 2007-May 2008), either by construction or because the evaluation period is only in the
short run (we tested for diﬀerences of the means across groups to conﬁrm balance over groups, and
p-values are reported in Table 2). They can therefore be used as interaction variables.
Only 31% of school committees in the sample contain at least one member who completed
primary school, which indicates an important heterogeneity across communities. Note that there is
no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in school committee members' seniority across control and treatment groups,
which indicates that the composition of school committee did not react to the grant program in the
short run. Note that the average wealth index does not have any material meaning in itself since the
scale is one that measures individual's wealth relative to one another. The average wealth index is
negative since the two school committee members are poorer, on average, than the school directors,
whose data was included in the construction of the wealth index. The standard deviation of this
wealth indicator is large (1.46), indicating an important heterogeneity of wealth across communities.
A minority (20%) of teachers in the average school are civil servants. Heterogeneity is large:
42% of schools have no civil servants and 35% have more than one third civil servants. Only 3%
of schools have a majority of civil servant teachers. The typical school director has been in his or
her position for slightly over 4 years. The variation of school director's seniority is not very large,
with a standard deviation of 2.68 years. A very small fraction (6%) of school directors have been in
charge for only one year, while 28% have been in charge for ﬁve years or more. In 82% of schools,
the director speaks the same language as the majority of people in the community, as measured by
a dummy equal to one when there is a common language.
Only the control group schools are used to generate the following descriptive statistics in this
section, with the objective for these statistics to be indicative of the pre-grant status of schools in
Tahoua and Zinder.
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Parent Participation in Schools
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics on parent participation in school management. These statistics
are computed over the control group schools to represent the natural state of parent participation
without the encouragement program.
On average, the school committee's last meeting occured 2.65 months before the survey, whereas
parental association's last meeting occured 3.69 months before the survey, which suggests a higher
activity of school committees than parental associations. More than half of school committees are
responsible for management tasks : 60% of school committees are responsible for school stationary
supplies and more than 74% are in charge of teaching materials and infrastructure. Three quarters
(77%) of school committees monitor the presence and punctuality of teachers and pupils, but only
two thirds (66%) have taken some kind of action against a pupil for absenteeism (pupil remedials),
and only one third (33%) have taken some kind of action against a teacher for absenteeism (teacher
remedials). Remedial teacher actions include talking to the teacher, warning the teacher, or com-
plaining to the teacher's supervisor. A third of school committees (30%) are in charge of collecting
contributions for the school, whereas a large majority of school committees (71%) are responsible
for managing expenditure of the fees. Parents participate in providing resources to schools: the
average parental contribution is 293 FCFA (about 59 US cents). In 84% of schools the community
provided in-kind contributions (such as food, building materials, or labor) to the school.
School Quality
Table 5 shows descriptive statistics on school quality. These statistics are computed over the control
group schools to represent the natural state of school quality without the encouragement program.
Teacher Presence Observed absenteeism among teachers is very high. On the day of the
unannounced survey visit, 10% of schools were closed (the visit was carried out on a day the
school was supposed to be open). Of schools that were open, 16% of school directors were absent,
and 24% of teachers were absent.23To accurately represent the loss of classroom time and avoid
reporting inconsistencies, this ﬁgure includes both excused and unexcused absences. Surveyors asked
respondents at the school about the reasons for teacher absences. In about one third of schools, no
reason was given. The fact that school committee members did not/could not indicate the reasons
23This ﬁgure is in line with observed absenteeism rates in other countries; see Chaudhury et al (2006) which
surveyed attendance in six countries and found 19% of teachers absent during spot checks.
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for teacher absenteeism is cause for concern, since it may indicate a lack of or weak attention to
teacher management and supervision. Among schools which provided reasons for teacher absences,
the most frequently cited reasons were (i) collecting salaries (34%); (ii) strike (33%); and (iii) illness
(19%).
Infrastructure The schools in Niger have low levels of equipment. There are 1.6 latrines per
school, and 13% of schools have access to water, while 34% have some sort of basic wall separating
the school from other public space. For the infastructure index, the classroom, desks, blackboard
and books ﬁgures are change from year to year (in order to control for previous levels). On average,
schools added 0.23 classroom buildings over the period 2007-2009, 3.5 desks, 0.65 blackboards, and
6.7 books.
Demand for education
Table 6 shows descriptive statistics on the demand for education. These statistics are computed
over the control group schools to represent the natural state of the demand for education without
the encouragement program.
Overall, 156 pupils registered per school in 2008-2009. Attendance is measured by the ratio of
pupils present the day of survey visit by the number of pupils who were registered at the beginning
of the school year. An average of 69% of pupils who were enrolled at the beginning of the school
year were present at school the day of visit, though this measure is based on a head count and
thus may confound absence and drop out. Schools reported that about 3.4% of pupils who were
registered at the beginning of the school year dropped out over the course of the year, or about 5
pupils per school on average. The dropout rate is highest in grade 6, at 5%. The dropout rate is
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across boys and girls.
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